Book Note: Why Nudge?: The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism, by Cass R. Sunstein by Adler, Dan
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 52, Issue 1 (Fall 2014) Article 12
Book Note: Why Nudge?: The Politics of
Libertarian Paternalism, by Cass R. Sunstein
Dan Adler
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Book Note
This Book Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode
Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information




WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN 
PATERNALISM, by Cass R. Sunstein1
WHAT IS THE LEGITIMATE SCOPE of government intervention into individual 
decision-making? In Why Nudge? The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism, Sunstein 
defends the novel claim that governments ought to influence—or nudge—
individuals into making choices that help them best achieve their desired goals. 
This book serves as a companion to the earlier text he co-wrote with Richard H. 
Thaler which outlines how failures in human reasoning contribute to suboptimal 
decision-making in the context of healthcare, financial planning, and other 
public policy issues.2 
This book is divided into six main parts. The Introduction outlines one 
very influential principle for determining the legitimate scope of government 
intervention. This is John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, which states simply that 
“[u]nless there is harm to others, the government cannot exercise power over 
people.”3 In defense of this principle, Sunstein points out the intuitive appeal of 
the epistemic argument: Each individual best knows his or her preferences, and 
so can best identify his or her ends and the best means of obtaining them.4
1. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014) 208 pages.
2. Richard H Thaler & Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness, revised ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
3. Supra note 1 at 4.
4. Ibid at 7.
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Chapter one presents an empirical challenge to the epistemic argument. 
Drawing on Daniel Kahneman’s research5 and the findings in Nudge6, Sunstein 
outlines the range of errors in human decision-making, including caring more 
about events or outcomes that will occur sooner rather than later7; ignoring 
features of a product or activity that are not salient8; making unrealistically 
optimistic predictions about one’s own behaviour and future prospects9; and 
making predictions about probabilities based on the ease with which a related 
event or example comes to mind.10 These errors prevent individuals from 
obtaining their chosen ends—resulting in what Sunstein refers to as “behavioural 
market failures.”11
Given that Mill’s harm principle does not account for these phenomena,12 
Sunstein argues that government intervention can correct behavioural market 
failures. Chapter two defends a type of government intervention called libertarian 
paternalism. It is a form of soft paternalism (in contrast to hard), which attempts 
to influence individual choices without imposing material costs.13 It is also a 
form of means paternalism (in contrast to ends), which attempts to influence only 
those actions individuals take to achieve their chosen aims.14 By combining these 
features, libertarian paternalism holds that governments should design public 
policy in such a way that guides individual decision-making to avoid the errors 
in reasoning that prevent people from attaining their chosen ends.
Chapter three defends one moral argument in favour of libertarian 
paternalism: It can improve people’s lives.15 Sunstein persuasively shows that 
objections to this claim are refuted empirically by the frequency of behavioural 
market failures.16 Chapter four defends a second moral argument in defense 
of libertarian paternalism: It preserves and enhances individual autonomy and 
5. For a comprehensive overview of his findings, see Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 
(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2011). See also Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The 
Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions, revised ed (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 
2010).
6. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 2.
7. Supra note 1 at 35.
8. Ibid at 40.
9. Ibid at 45.
10. Ibid at 48.
11. Ibid at 16.
12. Ibid at 81-82.
13. Ibid at 58.
14. Ibid at 68-69.
15. Ibid at 87.
16. Ibid at 108.
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freedom of choice.17 It does so because of the inevitability of choice architecture. 
This refers to the context in which individual decision-making takes place,18 
which is characterized by the ordering or physical arrangement of different 
choices, and the presence of default choices. Choice architecture can be designed 
in a way that helps people pursue the ends they choose.19 
Finally, chapter five considers some of the practical challenges posed by the 
implementation of paternalistic governmental policies. First, governments must 
be transparent about when and how they are designing paternalistic policies.20 
Second, there must be mechanisms to prevent abuses of power, which includes 
a requirement that it be easy for individuals to act against whatever paternalistic 
policies aim to achieve.21 Finally, the application of paternalistic policies 
should not interfere too stringently with individuals’ pursuit of pleasurable or 
meaningful, albeit risky, activities.22 Though these are important considerations, 
Sunstein successfully shows that they do not seriously undermine the potential 
benefits of libertarian paternalism.
Sunstein masterfully weaves together emerging research in behavioural 
economics with some of the most fundamental issues in moral philosophy. 
He colours his study with vivid examples of real world problems, producing a 
book that is highly readable and oftentimes quite funny. Still, its arguments are 
forceful and persuasive, leaving the reader with no doubt of the importance of the 
issues—for policymakers, lawmakers, and indeed for the public at large.
17. Ibid at 123.
18. Ibid at 14. 
19. Ibid at 128-31, 37-38.
20. Ibid at 144.
21. Ibid at 151.
22. Ibid at 154-55.

